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‘1867 and all that’:  
‘Federalism’ and Union in Britain and Canada
James Kennedy
In 1867 Walter Bagehot published The English Constitution, in which he extolled 
the virtues of  the British system of  government, a system that had evolved over 
centuries of  political development, producing a series of  stable and distinctive 
institutions. In the same year the Westminster parliament passed the British 
North America (BNA) Act thereby inaugurating the Canadian Confederation.1 
While not explicit in either ‘constitution’, both Britain and Canada were also 
‘unions’, multinational states which had been formed through the incorpo-
ration of  nationalities. By the end of  the nineteenth century, nationalists in 
Scotland and Québec questioned the degree to which these constitutions 
adequately accommodated their respective nations. This has been a recurrent 
theme ever since.
This essay contends that the specific character of  the political unions of  
Canada and Britain can tell us much about the ebb and flow of  sub-state 
political nationalism in these states, most especially in Scotland and Québec. 
In particular, the quality of  the ‘federalism’ employed by these unions is iden-
tified as key to explaining the relative success of  these states. The form that 
federalism takes is found to be particularly determinative of  the demands 
made by political nationalists. Crudely, Scotland has enjoyed an informal fed-
eralism arising from a cultural recognition of  its national status; in contrast a 
formal, constitutional federalism has given Québec significant political voice 
within the Canadian Confederation, yet recognition of  its cultural distinctive-
ness has been fraught. The paper has four parts: the first reviews the concept 
of  federalism, the middle sections provide an overview of  its practice in the 
cases of  Canada and Britain, identifying its relationship to the rise and fall of  
political nationalism; some reflections on the architecture of  these unions are 
offered by way of  conclusion.
1 It is worth noting that 1867 also witnessed the formation of  another union: the ‘Dual 
Monarchy’ of  the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
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I Federalisms
Nineteenth-century liberal theory gave federalism a ringing endorsement. John 
Stuart Mill ascribed positive qualities to federalism; he praised federal systems 
for their pacifism and for their ability to harmonise trade (which would itself  
mitigate against war): ‘it of  course puts an end to war and diplomatic quarrels, 
and usually also to restrictions on commerce between the states composing 
the union’.2 They were disposed to pacifism since ‘a federal government has 
not a sufficiently concentrated authority, to conduct with much efficiency any 
war but one of  self-defence’.3 Above all federalism was a way of  managing 
difference when people are unable to live under the same internal govern-
ment. While difference could take many forms, Mill identified race, language, 
religion and diverging political institutions as being particularly important.4 
But how does federalism operate in practice? Considerable conceptual 
confusion surrounds this question. Preston King’s distinction between ‘fed-
eralism’ and ‘federation’ is a good starting point.5 While federalism relates to 
an ideology or an ethos, federation refers simply to a type of  political institu-
tion. The preponderance of  literature on federalism has equated it with this 
latter sense. William H. Riker’s 1964 classic study of  ‘federalism’ exemplifies 
this. The definition of  federalism is seen there as unproblematic since it is 
a ‘precisely definable and easily recognisable constitutional artefact’ demar-
cated by specific institutions: ‘a government of  the federation and a set of  
governments of  the member units, in which both kinds of  governments rule 
over the same territory and people and each kind has the authority to make 
some decisions independently of  the other’.6 Yet Riker’s classification of  lib-
eral Canada and the United States, as well as communist Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union as federal systems based simply on their possession of  a set 
of  institutions – overlooking the actual practice of  these states – suggests that 
institutions alone are a poor indicator of  the practice of  federalism.
William S. Livingstone is critical of  this approach, since it is oblivious to 
the actual operation of  institutions: ‘whether a constitutional structure may 
properly be called federal depends not so much on the arrangement of  the 
institutions within it as it does on the manner in which these institutions are 
2 John Stuart Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ in idem, On Liberty 
and Other Essays, John Gray (ed.) (1861; Oxford 1991), 443.
3 Ibid., 443.
4 Ibid., 435.
5 Preston King, Federalism and Federation (London, 1982), 75.
6 W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (Boston, 1964), xi, 5.
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employed’.7 Therefore Livingstone suggests that federalism can be under-
stood in more sociological terms, as a way of  articulating and protecting the 
federal qualities of  a particular society, where diversity is grouped territorially.8 
Thus political systems are judged on how well they govern federal societies. 
Moreover the institutions-based approach fails to account for a certain fluid-
ity in the life of  institutions: a set of  institutions may operate in a manner 
unintended by its originators and the successful operation of  institutions may 
change over time, so that institutions which were successful in one period 
need not have the same success in another.9 As we shall see the Union gov-
ernment in Canada in the 1840s and 1850s exemplifies the first, while the 
increasing strain on the local state in late nineteenth-century Scotland exempli-
fies the second.
In Livingstone’s view federalism represents a compromise between the 
competing demands for autonomy and integration. The resulting constitu-
tion, therefore, will reflect their relative strengths: ‘the federal system is thus 
an institutionalisation of  the compromise between these two demands’. Thus 
federalism emerges as a relative, and not an absolute concept, a matter of  
degree and not of  kind. The tools that federal systems employ to manage 
diversity likewise vary and are in part a reflection of  the degree to which socie-
ties are segmented.10 Thus there is no ‘a priori list of  the characteristics of  a 
federal system’.11
In deeply divided plural societies practices and conventions may take the 
form of  a consociation, identified in Arend Lijphart’s description of  power-
sharing arrangements practiced in the Netherlands.12 Consociations are marked 
primarily through the existence of  élite co-operation. This is a feature of  the 
four key components which consociations are held to possess: government 
by a grand coalition is the most important, all groups are represented in a 
cabinet, a council/committee or among top office-holders; proportionality 
in political representation, the division of  government employment and 
 7 W. S. Livingstone, ‘A Note on the Nature of  Federalism’, Political Science Quarterly, 67 
(1952), 84. Livingstone’s view of  federalism influenced Paterson’s 1994 study, which 
is also influential in this paper. Cf. Lindsay Paterson, The Autonomy of  Modern Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1994), 20.
 8 Livingstone, ‘A Note on Federalism’, 84 – 5.
 9 Ibid., 84, 87.
10 These tools include not only particular institutions but also the manner in which they 
are operated. Ibid., 91.
11 Ibid., 88 – 91.
12 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT, 
1977).
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spending; a high degree of  internal autonomy of  groups; and with each 
group possessing a mutual veto over legislation which threatens its well-
being.13 Canada as both a unitary province and as a federation has possessed 
elements of  each of  these components allowing Lijphart to describe it as 
a ‘semi-consociational democracy’.14 Indeed the possession of  a federation 
is thought to be particularly conducive to the success of  consociations, 
where the political boundaries of  federal structures mirror the territorial 
concentration of  distinct groups.15
Clearly the federalisms that Livingstone and Riker depict are quite dif-
ferent. Riker’s definition is based exclusively on institutions; his focus is on 
federation rather than the practice of  federalism. In contrast Livingstone’s 
focus is on political practices, which may or may not be expressed through a 
formal federation. Livingstone’s view is not without controversy. Indeed, it is 
a view that many political scientists reject, believing that the term should be 
retained exclusively for an institutions-driven account. However the advantage 
of  Livingstone’s approach is to focus attention on how societies are actually 
governed rather than on how formal constitutions suggest that they are. This 
has particular implications for the cases of  Scotland and Québec.
Britain is often thought to be the very hallmark of  a unitary state, yet, as 
we will see, that state’s relationship to Scotland took a form that was decidedly 
federal. John Stuart Mill gives authority to this conception of  federalism, by 
citing the example of  the Union between Scotland and England to demon-
strate that a state need not proclaim itself  as federal in order to exhibit federal 
qualities: ‘a people may have the desire, and the capacity, for a closer union 
than one merely federal, while yet their local peculiarities and antecedents 
render considerable diversities desirable in the details of  their government’. By 
avoiding the ‘mania for uniformity’ prevalent on continental Europe, Mill sug-
gested that ‘a totally different system of  law, and very different administrative 
institutions, may exist in two portions of  a country without being any obstacle 
to legislative union’; on the continent the assumption was that a distinctive 
legal system would require a distinctive government.16 
Canada exemplified federal tendencies, yet its federalism was expressed 
differently: the practices of  the pre-1867 Province of  Canada were federal, 
despite its unitary character, and these practices continued following the 
13 Ibid., 25.
14 Ibid., 120 – 9.
15 Ibid., 42 – 3.
16 Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, 444 – 5.
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constitution of  Canada as a federation in 1867.17 The cases of  Canada and 
Britain suggest a distinction between a formal institutional federalism and an 
informal federalism, comprising a series of  practices that recognise the federal 
nature of  society. In the latter case a continuum exists between the simple 
recognition of  a group through to the development of  explicit consociational 
practices of  power-sharing.18
Yet it is worth bearing in mind Robert Dahl’s caution that on purely theo-
retical grounds no political unit is ‘inherently more democratic or otherwise 
more desirable than others’.19 What matters ultimately is whether political insti-
tutions and political practices are able successfully to meet the demands of  
governing multinational states. There are two issues in play here: does the for-
mal provision of  ‘voice’ within a political system engender ‘loyalty’ and thereby 
mitigate against ‘exit’?20 Michael Hechter argues that the institution of  indirect 
rule through the form of  a federation itself  militates against political national-
ism.21 Alternatively is it necessary formally to institute federalism so long as 
there are political practices in place which recognise a group’s cultural ‘worth’ 
and thereby avoid its misrecognition or non-recognition?22 The next two sec-
tions seek to explore these issues in the context of  Canada and Britain.
II Canada
1867 is a critical juncture in the political development of  Canada. It is from 
that date that the present Canadian constitution was established. However 
before examining Canadian Confederation it is also instructive to examine the 
system of  government which preceded it, especially as it related to Québec. 
The French cession of  New France to the British in 1763 brought a significant 
17 Mill suggested that federalism could be used to describe Canada’s mid-nineteenth 
century relationship with Britain: it constituted the ‘slightest kind of  federal union’, 
although not an equal federation, since while it possessed full power over its own 
affairs, it had little or no say in foreign policy. Ibid., 449.
18 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Brendan O’Leary, ‘An Iron Law of  Federalism and 
Nationalism?’, Nations and Nationalism, 7 (2001), 273 – 96
19 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Oxford, 1986), 126.
20 J. A. Hall, ‘How Homogeneous Need We Be?’, Sociology, 30 (1996), 163 – 71; cf. Albert 
O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
21 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford, 2000).
22 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of  Recognition’ in Charles Taylor et al, Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of  Recognition (Princeton, N. J., 1994).
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linguistic and religious minority into the British Empire. While recognition 
of  this minority was not immediately forthcoming, two subsequent acts (the 
Québec Act of  1774 and the Constitution Act of  1791) sought to safeguard 
the French language, Roman Catholicism, as well as the French civil law, and 
crucially allowed Catholics to vote and stand for office, something not avail-
able to British Catholics until 1829. The latter Act also created the separate 
legislatures of  predominantly English-speaking Upper and French-speaking 
Lower Canada. The structure of  the colonial administration in Lower Canada 
mirrored the social cleavages in the colony: French Canadian liberal profes-
sionals dominated the elected Legislative Assembly whilst Anglophones and 
‘reliable’ elements composed the appointed executive and legislative councils, 
where effective power was centred. Disaffection with this situation led to the 
Patriote rebellions of  1837 – 8, led by Louis-Joseph Papineau.
The defeat of  the rebellions led to the creation of  the Province of  Canada, 
a political structure designed to resolve the problems caused by ‘two nations 
warring within the bosom of  a single state’ within Lower Canada, which the 
Durham Report of  1839 had blamed for the Patriote rebellions.23 While the Act 
of  Union of  1840 sought to promote political assimilation by uniting Upper 
and Lower Canada (now Canada West and East respectively) under a single 
parliament, in practice the new political system was marked by negotiation 
and accommodation between British and French Canadians. It met all four 
of  the characteristics associated with contemporary consociationalism, which 
Lijphart identifies above. 
George-Etienne Cartier embodied the political mood of  French Canadians 
through the mid-nineteenth century. Having participated in the 1837 rebellions, 
he went on to jointly head the government of  the Province of  Canada with 
John A Macdonald (1857 – 62), before becoming the most prominent French 
Canadian supporter of  the Canadian Confederation of  1867 (which brought 
about the union of  the British North American colonies of  New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and Canada to form the Dominion of  Canada). Cartier believed 
that Confederation would allow French Canadians to assert their influence out-
side Québec, particularly in the westward expansion of  the Confederation, and 
he was closely associated with the formation of  the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
Canada’s first transcontinental railroad and the engine of  the drive westwards.
The sociological conditions were certainly favourable to the institution 
of  a federal constitution. The relative peace of  North America (the United 
23 C. P. Lucas (ed.), Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of  British North America (3 vols.; 
London, 1912).
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States’ civil war exempted) meant that a decentralised system of  government 
could be permitted. This stood in marked contrast to the state rivalries which 
characterised continental Europe and promoted highly centralised states. 
Federation also had the advantage of  allowing the effective governance of  
a geographically dispersed population and, perhaps most crucially from a 
French Canadian perspective, allowed for the preservation of  francophone 
Québec’s ‘distinct society’. By the late nineteenth century, however, French 
Canadian political élites had become increasingly concerned about the posi-
tion of  French Canadians within Confederation. In 1867 one province in four 
had been French-speaking, however as Confederation expanded and admitted 
additional provinces the ratio was reduced to one province in seven by 1910. 
This prompted competing interpretations of  Confederation itself.24 Among 
English-speaking Canadians Confederation was interpreted as a political com-
pact of  provinces, while French-speakers increasingly viewed it as a compact 
of  peoples: 
The Fathers of  Confederation set themselves a two-fold purpose. First, 
they wanted to rid the Central Government of  such business that could 
better be adjusted by the local authorities. Second, they wanted the two 
main elements of  the Canadian people – French and English – to enjoy 
equal rights under the constitution.25
It was in this context that a small group of  influential Nationalistes inspired by 
Henri Bourassa argued for a bi-national Canada. While Bourassa had come 
to prominence asserting Canadian sovereignty in response to British imperial 
demands, the Nationalistes’ domestic vision of  Canada was just as important. 
Their concerns were existential in character. Schooling crises outside Québec 
curbed the use of  French as a language of  instruction. Most notable were the 
schooling crises in Manitoba in the 1890s and in Ontario following the impo-
sition of  Regulation 17 by the Ontario Provincial government in 1912, which 
infamously sought to restrict both the use of  French as a language instruction 
and as a subject of  study, a move which was aimed directly at Ontario’s fast-
growing francophone population. In part these controversies were a response 
to significant demographic changes taking place in these provinces; the result 
of  an unprecedented influx of  non-francophone immigrants who had little 
24 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto, 
1997).
25 Olivar Asselin, A Quebec View of  Canadian Nationalism (Montreal, 1909), 22.
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interest in the ‘historic’ rights of  French Canadians. Against this background 
the Nationalistes campaigned for a bi-national settlement in which French and 
British Canadians would be politically equal, through an arrangement that 
approximates contemporary consociationalism. In doing so they sought the 
resurrection of  arrangements which had proven successful during the period 
of  the Province of  Canada. In their campaigns the Nationalistes promoted a 
French-speaking nation wider than the confines of  Québec, which incorpo-
rated French-speaking populations to the east and west in New Brunswick, 
Ontario and Manitoba. Unable to attract significant support among English-
speaking Canadians, this vision of  pan-Canadian nationalism ultimately failed. 
The Conscription Crisis of  1917 in which conscription was imposed on 
Québec despite its strong opposition, underlined the rift between English and 
French-speaking Canada.26 
The failure of  the federal state to respond adequately to these concerns 
directly led to the rise of  the conservative and Québec-centred nationalism 
of  the priest-historian, Lionel Groulx. This was an ideology which glorified 
Catholic rural Québec against modernist materialism; it was promoted in 
the interwar period by journals such as l’Action française, later l’Action nation-
ale, and influenced Maurice Duplessis and his Union Nationale (UN), which 
dominated Québec’s provincial politics from 1944 to 1960. The UN had 
been returned to power in a wave of  nationalism generated by a second 
Conscription Crisis in 1944. During the 1950s Duplessis resisted federal 
government social programmes in the name of  provincial autonomy and 
continued to defer to the Catholic Church in the realm of  social policy. At 
the same time he oversaw the business-friendly industrialisation of  Québec. 
These policies mobilised both liberals and progressive neo-nationalists in 
their shared opposition.27 
The election of  Jean Lesage’s provincial Liberal party in 1960 ushered in a 
period of  reform, known as the ‘Quiet Revolution’, in which the government 
sought to catch-up with the rest of  the developed world socially, economical-
ly and politically. Crucially it was the provincial Québec state which took the 
lead role in each of  these areas. To some, notably René Lévesque, a promi-
nent journalist and energy minister under Lesage, the progress achieved 
suggested that Québec could accomplish still more as an independent state. 
In 1968 Lévesque founded the Parti Québécois (PQ) with its platform of  
26 James Kennedy ‘“A Switzerland of  the North?” The Nationalistes and a Bi-national 
Canada’, Nations and Nationalism, 10 (2004), 499 – 518.
27 Michael Derek Behiels, Prelude to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution (Montreal, 1985).
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‘sovereignty-association’, in which Québec would be politically independent 
but would remain economically integrated with the rest of  Canada. The PQ 
came to power within eight years of  its formation. During its first term of  
office it passed significant language legislation and held a referendum on sov-
ereignty in 1980, losing by 40% to 60%. It lost power in 1985, after a second 
term in office, and went into a period of  retrenchment. 
However the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord in 1987 revived the 
PQ’s fortunes. Québec felt alienated since Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had 
‘repatriated’ the Canadian constitution in 1982, despite having failed to secure 
the approval of  the Québec government. Meech Lake was an attempt on the 
part of  new Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Québec Premier 
Robert Bourassa to bring Québec back within the constitutional fold. The 
chief  means by which this was to be accomplished was the inclusion of  a 
clause recognising Québec as a ‘distinct society’. This proved to be a hugely 
controversial measure outside Québec, angering both the indigenous First 
Nations and regionalist sentiment in the Canadian West. The failure of  the 
Meech Lake Accord to gain ratification was deeply felt in Québec; the percep-
tion was that this was a rejection of  Québec’s national distinctiveness. It had 
the immediate effect of  soaring poll support for both the PQ and its sover-
eignty platform. Notwithstanding the attempt to broker a new settlement (the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992), it was this initial sense of  rejection which led 
ultimately to the election of  the PQ in 1994 and the closeness of  the referen-
dum on sovereignty the following year: the ‘Yes’ side narrowly lost by 49.9% 
to 50.1%. 
Politics in Québec since the referendum have focused less on constitution-
al matters. Yet the three main parties all adopt a nationalist stance, claiming 
to protect Québec and its interests. The Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) has 
been in government since 2002. The breakthrough success of  the conserva-
tive Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) in the 2006 provincial election, 
coming second to the PLQ and relegating the PQ to third place, may partly 
be explained by its moderate nationalist position (it was a member of  the ‘Yes’ 
campaign in the 1995 referendum on sovereignty), which captures the mood 
of  current Québécois politics. Federal politics has recently had an impact in 
Québec: the rise of  the Conservative party has once again made Québec com-
petitive in federal elections. It is perhaps this that lies behind the Canadian 
House of  Commons’ parliamentary motion in 2007, with the support of  the 
nationalist Bloc Québécois, which took the unprecedented step of  declaring 
that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada. The parliamentary 
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motion which passed by 266 votes to 16 was largely symbolic since it carried 
no legal weight and promised Québec no additional powers. However it was 
precisely the demand for cultural recognition, rather than political voice that 
this symbolic gesture addressed.
Canada since 1867 has constituted a federation, and as a result Québec 
has enjoyed significant political voice. Yet political rule has not always taken 
a ‘federal’ form: schooling and conscription crises in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries respectively and the more recent attempts to re-write 
the constitution are cases in point. These have provided the ire to provoke 
first French Canadian then Québécois nationalism. Provincial politics too has 
played its part, notably in the advent of  the Quiet Revolution and the rise 
of  the PQ. This story contrasts with that of  Britain where Scotland has only 
recently acquired significant political voice. 
III Britain
Scotland’s formal independence was brought to an end with its Treaty of  Union 
with England in 1707. In exchange for access to imperial markets Scotland’s 
political élite negotiated a legislative union with England. As a result, in Nairn’s 
choice phrase it became a ‘decapitated national state’ retaining many of  the 
trappings of  formal statehood, namely, a legal system, an education system 
and a national church (the Presbyterian Church of  Scotland).28 Together with 
a distinctive system of  local government, this ‘holy trinity’ of  institutions 
formed the nucleus of  governance through the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. For all practical purposes the Union left the daily governance 
of  Scotland largely untouched. The institutions that mattered had been left 
unaffected by union.
However the political structure of  the British state began to change in the 
mid-nineteenth century, first due to the exigencies of  war and an expand-
ing empire and, as the century progressed, as a result of  the demands for 
improved housing, health and sanitation created by a growing and increasingly 
urban population. In both instances the result was the increasing centralisa-
tion of  power at Westminster. In the 1850s the National Association for the 
Vindication of  Scottish Rights emerged to champion the maintenance of  
strong local government. In the era between the First and Second Reform 
28 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of  Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London, 1977), 129.
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Acts, this was an élite movement which mobilised a privileged segment of  
Scottish society to demand not more but less central government interven-
tion.29 
But by the late nineteenth century more rather than less government inter-
vention was the order of  the day. In the 1880s it was the Scottish Home Rule 
Association which proposed devolution as the solution to Scotland’s ‘legisla-
tive neglect’. ‘Home Rule all Round’, in which Britain would become a formal 
federal system also gained support. However it is quite wrong to suggest that 
the demand for Scottish home rule was simply a by-product of  Irish agitation 
for home rule.30 The Young Scots’ Society took up the mantle of  home rule in 
the first decade of  the twentieth century. This was a society which was closely 
affiliated with the politically dominant Liberal party and which promoted a 
dual campaign of  home rule and radical social reform. The Young Scots were 
responding to what in contemporary parlance would be referred to as a ‘dem-
ocratic deficit’: during this period increasingly powerful boards or ‘quangos’ 
administered social legislation in Scotland largely outside democratic scrutiny. 
Moreover they claimed that only limited attention was given to Scottish mat-
ters at Westminster with the result that progressive legislation was effectively 
stalled, or inappropriate measures imposed:
Scotland comes as an afterthought. The proposed legislation is framed 
by an English minister with the assistance of  English lawyers, and it 
is based on English experience, custom and law. A clause at the end 
makes it applicable to Scotland, and thus the Scottish people have to 
make the best they can of  a measure that under their different expe-
rience, custom and law, is wholly unsuitable and often worse than 
useless.31
Political pressure for home rule had some success, namely to administrative 
devolution. Yet there is irony in that this success effectively undercut the 
demand for legislative devolution. The Young Scots argued that the embry-
onic welfare state should be distinctly Scottish in order to respond effectively 
to Scotland’s distinct needs. The success of  the fight to ensure Scottish control 
29 Graeme Morton, Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830 – 1860 (East 
Linton, 1999).
30 cf. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707 – 1994 
(London, 1994).
31 Young Scots’ Society, Manifesto and Appeal to the Scottish People on Scottish Home Rule 
(Glasgow, 1912), 2.
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over welfare provision had paradoxical implications for the campaign for home 
rule. Far from paving the way for the imminent recall of  the Scottish parlia-
ment, administrative control over welfare effectively undermined the urgency 
of  the demand for legislative devolution. The example of  National Insurance 
in 1911 is instructive. Its introduction received this favourable review from a 
home rule supporting publication:
The striking success of  the scheme on this side of  the Border is a mag-
nificent tribute to the administrative genius of  the Scot . . . ‘Scotland 
so far as National Insurance is concerned, is under Home Rule’. As a result, 
the percentage of  persons who are insured is higher in Scotland than 
in England, Ireland or Wales. The vast organisation which achieved 
this distinction could never have been worked from an office in 
London.32
This substantiates Lindsay Paterson’s claim that welfare legislation was not 
only a response to socialist agitation, but that ‘it was equally a displacement of  
nationalist pressure for a separate legislature’.33
This was the pattern that was followed most especially in the immediate 
post-World War II period: distinctively Scottish institutions administered the 
growing welfare apparatus in Scotland. The institutions of  administrative 
devolution were various. Core components included the Scottish Office and 
Scottish Education Department, both established in the 1880s and initially 
headquartered in London before moving to Edinburgh in 1939. These depart-
ments were headed by the Scottish Secretary, who attained full cabinet rank 
and became Secretary of  State for Scotland in 1926. Equally central was the 
Scottish Grand Committee, formed by Westminster Scottish MPs to consid-
er Scottish legislation, and the Scottish Select Committee which oversaw the 
workings of  the Scottish Office. In James Kellas’ view these elements consti-
tuted a ‘Scottish political system’; a view countered by Midwinter, Keating and 
Mitchell who emphasise the dominance of  the British central state during this 
period.34 In the post-war era this state-led social and economic re-generation 
enjoyed considerable success. However this political system came under strain 
32 Scottish Nation, November 1913, 13 (my emphasis).
33 Lindsay Paterson, ‘Scottish Autonomy and the Future of  the Welfare State’, Scottish 
Affairs, 19 (1997), 57.
34 James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge, 1984); Arthur Midwinter, 
Michael Keating and James Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland (London, 
1991).
‘1867 and all that’: ‘Federalism’ and Union in Britain and Canada 305
during the 1960s and 1970s, as successive British governments identified the 
regions as requiring additional attention. In this regional planning Scotland 
was identified as a ‘problem’. Thus the way in which Scotland was ‘institution-
ally defined’ mattered and had implications for political nationalism, giving 
legitimacy to claims that ‘Britain isn’t working’.35
It was during this period that the Scottish National Party (SNP) enjoyed 
particular success, the product of  rising expectations among a young genera-
tion frustrated by Britain’s economic and political stagnation and buoyed up 
by the discovery of  North Sea oil. ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil!’ ran the SNP’s most 
successful campaign. The general election results of  1974 saw the party secure 
seven then eleven MPs in the February and October elections respectively. The 
failure of  the home rule referendum in 1979 began a period of  demobilisa-
tion, however. It was Margaret Thatcher who revived the SNP’s fortunes, and 
more generally that of  the home rule cause, in the late 1980s. The generalised 
sense that the Conservative administration was a government without popular 
support in Scotland was given concrete form with the imposition of  the Poll 
Tax in 1988, a local government tax introduced one year ahead of  the rest of  
the United Kingdom. Through the period of  Thatcher’s rule a class of  state-
employed professionals, including local government and NHS employees, had 
been mobilised to join the home rule movement; in other words, those directly 
affected by attempts to reform the public sector.36 
The 1997 landslide of  New Labour in the United Kingdom also herald-
ed a new era for Scottish politics. Within months of  taking office the new 
government issued a white paper and launched what was to be a successful 
referendum campaign. Two years later Scottish elections were held and the 
first Scottish parliament for almost three hundred years met. Curiously, in the 
immediate period following the (re-)establishment of  the Scottish parliament 
a sort of  national paralysis set in, in which the devolved institutions failed 
to meet popular aspirations. In part, this was the result of  the decade-long 
anticipation of  devolution which had generated high expectations. This was 
combined with a particular set of  circumstances which affected the devolved 
administrations: the sudden and tragic death of  the first First Minister, Donald 
Dewar; the perceived dithering of  the short-lived administration of  his suc-
cessor, Henry McLeish; and the competent though uninspiring leadership of  
Jack McConnell. Despite its legislative achievements, there was an impression 
35 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (2nd edition; Chicago, 1994), 324 – 5.
36 Jonathan Hearn, ‘Identity, Class and Civil Society’, Nations and Nationalism, 8 (2002), 
15 – 30.
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that the devolution settlement was merely a more elaborate mechanism of  
local government, a charge that opponents of  devolution had long contended. 
In other words while Scotland now enjoyed a formal political voice there was 
a sense that its new political institutions were failing to secure its cultural rec-
ognition.
The minority SNP administration elected in May 2007 appears to have set 
itself  the task of  raising the profile of  the devolved administration in Scotland 
to attain a national stature. This is epitomised above all by the symbolic name 
change of  ‘Scottish Executive’ to ‘Scottish Government’. In this sense there 
is an attempt to acquire a cultural and political recognition. Tellingly this has 
also been seen in the presentation of  Alex Salmond as First Minister: the first 
meeting between the Scottish First Minister and the British Prime Minister 
was carefully staged in ‘neutral’ Belfast against the backdrop of  the meeting 
of  the British-Irish Council. 
Since the late nineteenth century political nationalism in Scotland has 
largely been devoted to the achievement of  a formal political voice, in the 
form of  legislative devolution, and only more recently in substantial, but not 
majority, support for independence. Administrative devolution initially off-
set support for legislative devolution. However, the centralising policies of  
the Conservative government, effectively undercutting local autonomy in 
Scotland, were the catalyst which resulted in home rule. Since 1999 the failure 
of  successive devolved governments to assume a national mantle allowed the 
SNP to attain office claiming that it would ‘fight for Scotland’.
IV Conclusion: The ‘architecture of  federalism’
The architecture of  federalism matters and has implications for the successful 
accommodation of  sub-state nationalism: federalism has been identified in 
both Britain and Canada. Yet it took a distinctive form in each context. 
Since 1867 Canada has possessed a formal constitutional federalism, yet 
informal federal practices characterised the preceding Province of  Canada, and 
have continued to be practiced since Confederation. In his widely acclaimed 
essay, ‘The Politics of  Recognition’, the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor 
proposes that what lies behind much ‘identity politics’ is recognition or its 
absence.37 Confederation ensured that Québec had a formal political voice. 
37 Taylor, ‘The Politics of  Recognition’.
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Nationalists have been particularly effective in amassing a range of  powers 
in the Québec state, whereby Québec possesses more powers than any other 
corresponding sub-state in the developed North38 yet curiously cultural rec-
ognition has been denied. This was most clearly seen in the failure to ratify 
the Meech Lake Accord, which would have ensured official recognition of  
Québec as a ‘distinct society’. It remains unclear whether the federal parlia-
mentary motion passed in 2007, acknowledging the Québécois to be a nation, 
will have any long-term impact in this regard.
In contrast, Scotland until 1999 enjoyed cultural recognition, given sub-
stance through a range of  informal and formal practices which acknowledged 
its national status; however, it lacked formal political voice in the institutional-
ised form of  an executive and legislature. The creation of  a devolved parliament 
marked a break with previous governance, captured well by Tom Nairn: ‘a 
parliament is not in fact just another institution in civil society, devoted to the 
completion or extension of  “low politics” . . . it implies a qualitative shift to 
the “high politics” of  last resort responsibility and extra-local status’.39 This 
transition was not straightforward, however, since the acquisition of  a political 
voice alone is not, by itself, sufficient; it also requires an accompanying cultural 
recognition that the devolved institutions are national institutions. 
There is thus a phenomenological distinction between Scottish and 
Québécois nationalism. In Scotland political nationalism has sought a formal 
institutional voice within, and more recently outside the British political sys-
tem. Scotland has historically enjoyed an informal cultural recognition of  its 
national distinctiveness. In Québec it is the demand for the formal cultural 
recognition of  difference that lies at the core of  its political nationalism. For 
the PQ this requires sovereignty, while for others a range of  options have been 
advanced such as bi-nationalism, autonomy and ‘distinct society’ status. These 
demands are distinct and reflect the contrasting ways in which federalism has 
been expressed in Britain and Canada.
Federalism has been found to be a relatively malleable set of  tools able to 
provide voice through the formal institution of  federations and recognition 
through the adoption of  federal practices.40 Both elements are necessary in 
order to meet the aspirations of  sub-state nations. This has resonance with the 
findings of  Brendan O’Leary that formal federations with significant national 
38 The list here includes Scotland but also Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders and 
Waloonia.
39 Tom Nairn, Faces of  Nationalism: Janus Revisited (London, 1997), 237, n.18.
40 Riker, Federalism; Livingston, ‘A Note on the Nature of  Federalism’.
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minorities need to be accompanied by informal practices, most especially 
consociationalism.41 In other words, both formal and informal federalism are 
required.
University of  Edinburgh
41 O’Leary, ‘An Iron Law of  Federalism’. 
